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Notes
APPLICATION OF THE COST AND VALUE THEORIES
IN MEASURING CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY
The problem of determining the damages for which a building
contractor may be liable, where his performance is not in exact
accord with the contract specifications, has caused much concern
in the construction field. The task of properly guarding the interests
of both the builder and the owner has never been simple, for too
often it appears that one will profit at the expense of the other. The
purpose of this note is to-bring out the problems inherent in making
the proper decisions for awarding damages.
The difficulties involved in deciding when to use the cost rule
(cost of completing the contract) as opposed to the value rule (dif-
ference in the market value of the contractor's actual performance
and the value of full performance) must be considered in order to
realize the full scope of the problems. In the ordinary case, the cost
rule is the generally accepted mode of determining the damages,
but the value rule has proven useful in situations where economic
waste is a potential threat if the cost rule is applied without sound
discretion. One may feel that he has a right to receive exactly what
he contracted for, and fundamentally he should be given that right,
but the effect which recognition of such right will have on society.
must be reckoned with, and undue waste can hardly be thought of as
a benefit to the public welfare.
There are several ways of stating when the value rule may be
used instead of the cost rule. Basically, however, these statements
may be placed in two broad categories, the distinguishing factor
being the weight placed on good faith. In one of the categories are
the expressions of Professors Williston and Corbin, along with the
provision for measuring damages as contained in the Restatement
of Contracts, which omit any reference to good faith as a prerequisite
to use of the value rule. In the other category is the statement on the
measure of damages as formulated in American Jurisprudence, where
the existence of good faith is stressed as a prerequisite to applica-
tion of the value rule. As a means of developing more fully the
implications of these two categories, the views of these four author-
ities will be set forth and discussed separately.
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Williston, after pointing out that where the contractor fails to
keep his agreement the measure of the damages should be the sum
which will put the employer in as good a position as if the contract
had been performed, goes on to say:
If the defect is remediable from a practical standpoint, recovery
generally will be based on the market price of completing or cor-
recting the performance, and this will generally be shown by the cost
of getting work done or completed by another person. If the defect
is not thus remediable, damages are based on the difference between
the value of the defective structure and that of the structure if prop-
erly completed.1
It is significant that in this statement of the rule for measuring dam-
ages no mention is made of good faith or lack of wilfulness. Conse-
quently, at least one court has interpreted this statement as "only
requiring that the defect not be remediable from a practical stand-
point to 'trigger' the change" from the cost rule to the value rule.2
Other courts have interpreted Williston's statement more narrowly.
For instance, in Bellizzi v. Huntley Estates, Inc.,8 which involved the
construction of a driveway that appeared to be inaccessible at times
due to its elevation in comparison to that of the street, it was held
error to exclude evidence of the value of the property as delivered
and to charge the jury that the measure of damages was the cost of
making the driveway conform to the contract. The court said:
[Tihe jury should have been instructed that if there was substan-
tial performance of the whole contract on the part of the defendant,
or if there was a breach of contract by defendant and the failure
to perform was not in bad faith, and destruction and reconstruction
were necessary to get a driveway as was agreed to be built, the
jury could not allow the cost thereof if such cost would exceed the
difference between the value of the premises as they were with the
driveway as built and the value with a driveway as it should have
been built.4 [Emphasis added.]
Williston was cited as an authority for the proposition, thereby indi-
cating an assumption by the court that "good faith" is an essential
to use of the value rule even under his theory of damages.
The rule for measuring damages as formulated in the Restatement
of Contracts emphasizes the need for avoiding economic waste when-
ever possible. Section 346 provides that the measure of damages for
defective or unfinished construction work shall be either:
15 Williston Contracts § 1363, at 3825-6 (Rev. ed. 1937).2 Shell v. Scinidt, 164 Cal. App. 2d 350, 330 P. 2d 817, 823 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958). A more detailed comment on this will be given subsequently.
3 1 A.D.2d 683, 147 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1955). The purchase price of the house
was $16,740, and the jury had rendered a verdict of $5,000 to reconstruct the
driveway.
4 147 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
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(i) the reasonable cost of construction and completion in accord-
ance with the contract, if this is possible and does not involve
unreasonable economic waste; or
(ii) the difference between the value that the product contracted
for would have had and the value of the performance that has
been received by the plaintiff, if construction and completion
in accordance with the contract would involve unreasonable eco-
nomic waste.5
The comments to this section point out that the purpose of allowing
recovery is to put the injured party in a position comparable to that
for which he bargained. But this does not mean that he is to be
placed in the "same specific physical position." The injured party is
allowed either a "sum of money sufficient to produce the physical
product contracted for" or "the exchange value that that product
would have had if it had been constructed."6 The two may at times be
equal, but where they are not, consideration must be given to whether
it would be "imprudent and unreasonable" to tear down and re-
construct the structure in question. If it is unreasonable, then "[t]he
law does not require damages to be measured by a method requiring
such economic waste."7
The intent of the Restatement provision to make the injured party
whole and no more can be seen in the case of Ficara v. Belleau."
There the contract price for installing a heating and cooling system
was $6,200. After receiving $4,200, the contractor wilfully abandoned
the contract. It was found by an auditor that the owner reasonably
paid $2,361 to another contractor to complete the job. However, the
injured party was allowed to recover only $361 rather than the sum
paid to complete the contract, since the latter would have meant
the plaintiff was obtaining a $6,200 heating and cooling system for
$4,200. The court declared, "It is not the policy of our law to award
damages which would put a plaintiff in a better position than if the
defendant had carried out his contract."9
A third formulation of the rule for measuring damages which
also omits any reference to good faith is that provided by Corbin.
The similarity between his formulation of the rule and that contained
in the Restatement can be easily detected. He says:
For breach of defective construction, whether it is partial or total,
and for a total breach by refusal and failure to complete the work,
the injured party can get a judgment for damages measured by the
reasonable cost of reconstruction and completion in accordance with
1 Restatement, Contracts § 346 (1)(a) (1932).
6 Id., comment b.
7 Ibid.
88331 Mass. 80, 117 N.E.2d 287 (1954).
9 117 N.E.2d at 289.
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the contract, if this is possible and does not involve unreasonable
economic waste.1 0
In the following section Corbin adds:
If it is made to appear that physical reconstruction and completion
in accordance with the contract will involve unreasonable economic
waste by destruction of usable property or otherwise, the damages
awarded for the contractor's breach will be measured by the dif-
ference between the market value that the structure contracted for
would have had and that of the imperfect structure received by the
plaintiff.'1
The application of this rule, just as with the rules set forth by Willis-
ton and the Restatement, will not guarantee that the injured party
will obtain a completed structure meeting the exact specifications of
the contract, but his pecuniary position will be as good.
The remaining authority, American Jurisprudence,12 is specific in
requiring lack of wilfulness as a prerequisite to use of the value rule.
First it states as a general rule one is entitled to have what he con-
tracts for or its equivalent and that a majority of jurisdictions apply
the cost rule where the defects are such as can be remedied without
unreasonable reconstruction so as to make the work conform to the
contract. This authority then goes on to say:
But where, in order to conform the work to the contract require-
ments, a substantial part of what has been done must be undone,
and the contractor has acted in good faith, or the owner has taken
possession, the latter is not permitted to recover the cost of making
the change, but may recover the difference in value.13 [Emphasis
added.]
Such a rule as this can give rise to a rather harsh result. It can
be interpreted so as to invoke the cost rule even though correction
of defects would involve "unreasonable economic waste" and even
though the result is to award damages which are greater than the
difference in value between the work as done and as it ought to
have been done.14 Take, for example, the case of Groves v. John
Wunder Co.15 The defendant contractor agreed to remove sand and
1.05 Corbin, Contracts § 1089 at 408-9 (1951). Professor Corbin in § 1090
makes the statement that where there are alternative methods for the measuring
of damages, the choice may depend upon the character and quality of the con-
duct of the party guilty of the breach. It is submitted, however, that Professor
Corbin intends such a choice to be made only in cases where the builder had
"intent to cheat and defraud," and that the availability of such a choice would
not preclude the use of the value theory where the threat of economic waste
prevailed.
115 Corbin, Contracts § 1090, at 411 (1951).
129 Am. Jur. Building and Construction Contracts § 152 (1937).
1a Ibid.
14 Id. (Supp. 1959).
15 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939). See also Annot., 123 A.L.R. 515
(1939).
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gravel from the plaintiff's property and to leave the land in a uni-
form grade and at a required level. The defendant removed certain
amounts of the sand and gravel as he chose and did not leave the
ground in a uniform grade. The lower court found that it would
cost around $60,000 to complete the work, but that the reasonable
value of the land, if the contract had been completed, would have
been only $12,160. The trial judge awarded this latter sum with
interest. On appeal, the court in very strong language emphasized
the bad faith nature of the defendant's conduct. They said:
Defendant's breach of contract was wilful. There was nothing of
good faith about it. Hence, that the decision below handsomely re-
wards bad faith and deliberate breach of contract is obvious. That
is not allowable.16
The court held that such a wilful breach did not entitle the defendant
to the benefits of the equitable doctrine of substantial performance
and that the proper measure of damages was the cost of doing what
the contractor had promised. The court could not find any grounds
for considering the economic waste involved since, in the opinion
of the judges, this defense can be invoked only when a structure
already erected must be taken down.y7
At first glance it may be thought that there is little practical
difference among the aforementioned rules. No doubt this is true
of the first three which omit any reference to good faith. Perhaps in
the ordinary case they could be used interchangeably, and the re-
sults would be the same. But this would not hold true with reference
to the fourth rule. As illustrated by the Groves case, under the same
set of facts the application of the fourth rule can give a different
result than if one of the other three rules were applied.
To further illustrate this potential difference, the situation which
arose recently in Shell v. Schmidt' can be given as an example. There,
the defendant contractor had built numerous houses under a gov-
ernment contract. A group of purchasers brought an action as third
party beneficiaries wherein it was found that the houses did not
meet the contract specifications, and that the defendant had not sub-
stantially performed the contract. On an appeal involving the ques-
tion as to the proper method of computing damages, the plaintiff
homeowners asked for the application of the cost theory, while the
16 286 N.W. at 236. The defendant was engaged in a sand and gravel busi-
ness, which explains why he would be interested in removing this sand and
gravel despite the high cost.
17 It is of interest to note in the dissent that this opinion was decided by a
minority of the court. Two members were ill, and two dissented.
18 Shell v. Schmidt, supra note 2.
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defendant maintained that the value rule should be applied. The
California court found that some of the deviations had been inten-
tionally made, and that such intent meant the defendant's conduct
was wilful in making the alterations. Therefore, the court concluded
there was a lack of good faith and applied the cost rule. In connec-
tion with this conclusion, it is interesting to note that defendant
contended for the rule as stated in American Jurisprudence.19 That
rule, as already pointed out, demands that there be good faith on
the part of the builder. When the defendant was found to have
intentionally deviated from the contract, and it was established that
such deviation in California constituted a wilful deviation, then it
followed that the defendant could not successfully invoke the value
theory under a rule which requires as a prerequisite lack of wil-
fulness.
It is submitted the position of the California court that "inten-
tional" conduct constitutes "wilfulness" is questionable. At least one
authority, Corbin, disagrees with the court's conclusion that sub-
stantial performance cannot exist when any part of the variance from
the contract specifications is "intentional." He says with reference to
the case:
[T]he court [has] laid down too strict a rule, and... the defendant
was entitled to offer proof that his performance was 'substantial
performance,' although the variances were so great that he prob-
ably would have failed in his effort. The question is a question of
fact, requiring more than the mere application of a supposed rule
of law. This author agrees with the court that the degree and kind
of variance may be such that performance is less than 'substantial'
even though it has a market value equal to that of the exact per-
formance promised; also, that the intention (or wilfulness) of the
contractor is a factor for consideration by the jury (but not in itself
decisive).20
Corbin goes on to disagree with the court's interpretation of the
legal effect of substantial performance as constituting full perform-
ance, declaring that substantial performance is never full perform-
ance. Corbin submits that anything less than full performance is a
breach, but he concedes that breaches are not all the same size or
19 Supra note 10. With regard to the American Jurisprudence rule, it should
be noted that before the value rule will be applied the defendant must prove
that "a substantial part of what has been done must be undone." By contending
that he had substantially performed the contract and that the value of his com-
pleted work was equivalent to that required by the contract, the defendant in
the Shell case tended to defeat his own argument. Instead of pointing out that
there would be economic waste in making the work conform to the contract as
required by the rule, the defendant alleged that his performance was substan-
tially that contracted for, and that it would not be necessary to undo any of the
work.205 Corbin, Contracts § 1089 (1951, Supp. 1959).
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of the same degree of importance. He concludes that a "trivial"
breach should not prevent substantial performance, thereby causing
use of the cost rule, even if the breach is "intentional," for too often
actual completion would cause unreasonable economic waste.21
The defendant in the Shell case might have presented a better de-
fense if he had adopted one of the versions of the damage rule not
specifically requiring good faith. As pointed out previously Willis-
ton requires only that the defect not be remedial from a practical
standpoint before the value rule may be applied. Corbin requires
only a showing of unreasonable economic waste, a view also re-
flected in the Restatement. Hence, it appears that under any one
of these statements of the rule the defendant would not have had to
allege lack of wilfullness in order to shift the measure of damages
from the customary cost theory to the value theory.22
There is much to be said against placing too much significance
on the terms "wilful" and "intentional." The court in the Shell case
has given them great weight and in some respects has distorted their
true meanings so as to support the opinion. Professor Corbin points out
that such words are "epithets characterizing the quality of the con-
duct of one guilty of a breach of contract and expressing the mental
attitude of the court."23 These words ought to be used with discretion,
and it should always be kept in mind that the rules surrounding them
are flexible. The operation of these terms should be such that "punish-
ments are not 'cruel and unusual,' so that 'the penalty may fit the
crime.' Not even a 'wilful' wrongdoer is an outlaw; and the enrich-
ment of even an injured man may become unjust."24 Corbin takes
a realistic view with regard to the interpretation of these terms, and
consequently makes one realize that there is always room for leniency.
In support of this plea for leniency, it is interesting to note that
there is an extremely liberal variant rule which provides that a de-
fendant contractor is entitled to either the cost rule or the value rule,
whichever proves to be the less costly of the two. This doctrine is
21 Ibid.22 However, had the defendant invoked one of these versions of the dam-
age rule, the problem would still remain whether he forfeited use of the value
theory when he offered proof that the work he had performed was substantially
the same as that which he had agreed to do and could be corrected without
destruction of the structure. See note 19 supra. The defendant should have
pointed out that there would be unreasonable economic waste in making the
work conform to the contract, and from the facts of the case the defendant might
well have been able to prove this. Quite possibly this defense was disregarded
due to a mistaken idea that substantial performance alone would invoke the
value theory.
23 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1123, at 548 (1951). See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 137
(1920) on wilful and intentional variations.
24 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1123, at 548 (1951).
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admittedly a minority view, but the fact that it does exist lends sup-
port to the idea that courts do use discretion in determining what
damages to apply.25
The difficulties involved in determining when the value theory
should be "triggered" into action should be evident from the above
discussion. There are times when the work performed will be of no
value to the owner despite its monetary value, as where the struc-
ture produced cannot be used for the purpose of the contract. But
there are other instances "where it is clear that in contracting for
the work in question the owner was not seeking a result dictated by
whim or personal taste but was contemplating practical value .... " 2
In the latter case, it is felt that a contractor who has intentionally
deviated within reasonable limits should be allowed to ask for the
application of the value theory. Society frowns on waste in our
national economy, and to award costs which will entail needless de-
struction of existing structures creates an undesirable situation.
William M. Dishman, Jr.
25 See 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1089, at 48 (1951). Corbin rejects the variant
rule as such, but nevertheless it is recognized. To point out further the discre-
tion that a court might exercise, Cassinelli v. Stacy, 238 Ky. 827, 38 S.W.2d
980 (1931), would allow the cost of correction for minor defects but the dif-
ference between the contract price and the value of the structure for a major
defect, such as an "unlevel floor."26 Annot., 123 A.L.R. 515, 518 (1939).
